










limited,	 but	 surprise	 has	 been	 used	 as	 a	 way	 of	 defending	 the	 epistemic	 privilege	 of	
experiments	 over	 simulations.	 The	 argument	 is	 that	 while	 experiments	 can	 ‘confound’,	
simulations	can	merely	surprise	(Morgan	2005).	Our	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	show	that	the	










so,	 why?	 What	 is	 the	 value	 of	 surprise	 in	 science?	 In	 addressing	 such	 questions	
discussions	 have	 tended	 to	 focus	 on	 one	 of	 two	 features	 of	 scientific	 practice:	 novel	
predictions	and	 their	 role	 in	 the	 realism	debate	 (see	Hitchcock	and	Sober	2004);	 and	









would	 be	 the	 fogging	 of	 Becquerel’s	 photographic	 plates,	 leading	 to	 the	 discovery	 of	







science	 can	be	usefully	extended	 to	 include	 two	 further	 features	of	 scientific	practice,	
namely	 novel	 thought	 experiments	 and	 theoretical	 derivations.	 We	 focus	 on	 these	
because	thought	experiments	are	also	said	to	generate	predictions	and	even,	in	a	certain	
sense	 may	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 producing	 phenomena.	 More	 generally,	 both	 thought	
experiments	and	theoretical	derivations	can	be	thought	of	as	producing	‘outcomes’,	just	
as	computer	simulations	do,	yet	there	has	been	considerably	less	discussion	of	surprise	
in	 these	 cases.	 Given	 their	 central	 importance	 to	 science,	 there	 is	 obvious	 value	 in	
extending	the	discussion	in	this	direction.	Furthermore,	both	thought	experiments	and	
theoretical	derivations	offer	a	novel	context	 in	which	 to	discuss	surprise	as	 they	both	









unexplainable	 within	 the	 given	 realm	 of	 theory’	 (2005,	 p.	 324).	 Likewise,	 Ritson	






The	 outcome	 of	 a	 computer	 simulation,	 say,	 is	 argued	 to	 be	 only	 ‘merely’	 surprising	
because	 it	 is	 ultimately	 explicable	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 theories	 in	 terms	 of	 which	 the	
simulation	was	constructed.	Any	surprise	 in	 that	case	must	presumably	be	due	 to	 the	
scientist’s	cognitive	limitations	when	it	comes	to	following	the	steps	of	the	simulation,	
















knowledge.	 Following	 Currie	 (2018),	 we	 shall	 call	 this	 sense	 of	 surprise	 ‘productive	











that	 a	 lot	hinges	on	what	 counts	as	 the	 ‘given	 realm	of	 theory’.	Again,	with	a	 suitable	
choice	of	that	realm,	we	shall	argue	that	Einstein’s	result	should	be	regarded	as	surprising	








how	 they	 compare	 with	 ordinary	 ‘physical’	 experiments.	 Computer	 simulations	 have	
been	referred	to	as	virtual	experiments,	experiments	 in	silico,	or	experiments	without	
materiality.	And	some	have	claimed	that	 ‘Simulation	modelling	 is	 just	another	 form	of	
experimentation’	 (Norton	 and	 Suppe	 2001,	 p.	 92).2	 But	 their	 status	 as	 genuinely	
experimental	 has	 been	 contested	 as	 they	 do	 not	 intervene	 in	 the	 natural	 world	 and	
instead,	 it	 has	 been	 claimed,	 study	 ‘hypothetical	worlds’	 (Lenhard	 2018).	One	way	 in	
which	the	relation	between	these	two	practices	has	been	explored	is	through	Morgan’s	
(2005)	distinction	between	mere	surprise	and	confoundment,	originally	presented	via	
the	 comparison	 between	 modelling	 and	 experiment	 in	 economics.	 Boumans	 (2012),	





















for	 (albeit	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 simpler	 to	manipulate),	 whereas	 the	 object	 of	 study	 in	 a	
simulation	only	represents	the	world	outside	of	the	simulation.4		
	







To	 see	 this	 difference,	 consider	 surprise	 in	 simulations.	 Scientists	 are	 often	 ignorant	
about	certain	features	of	their	simulations	and	even	if	they	know	everything	about	the	
starting	assumption	of	their	models	and	the	rules	for	how	the	system	will	change	over	











4	 For	Morgan,	 this	 alone	 has	 epistemological	 implications:	 ‘we	 are	more	 justified	 in	 claiming	 to	 learn	
something	 about	 the	world	 from	 experiment	 because	 the	world	 and	 experiment	 share	 the	 same	 stuff’	
(2005,	p.	323,).	There	are	many	issues	with	the	materiality	argument,	including	problems	establishing	what	
“materially	similar”	actually	consists	in	(Parke	2014)	and	some	have	suggested	it	is	relevant	similarity,	not	





















To	 summarise	Morgan’s	 argument:	 in	 a	 computer	 simulation,	 surprising	 results	 only	
arise	 because	we	 do	 not	 have	 epistemic	 access	 to	 all	 the	 consequences	 of	 our	model	




















have	 taken	 the	 “experimental”	 aspect	 of	 thought	 experiments	 seriously,	 claiming	 that	
thought	experiments	are	experiments	in	the	same	sense	as	lab-based	experiments	or	are	































sense.	 In	 light	 of	 these	 comparisons,	 we	 can	 now	 think	 about	 Morgan’s	 surprise-

































as	 an	 illustrative	 example.	 This	 undermines	Aristotle’s	 theory	 that	 heavier	 bodies	 fall	
faster	than	lighter	ones.	Galileo	asks	us	to	imagine	attaching	two	balls	together,	a	heavy	





















empirical	data	 in	a	new	way’	 (ibid.,	p.	11)	but	rather,	 involve	genuine	discovery.	Here,	



























also	arguments.	The	 thought	 is	 that	computer	simulations	raise	a	parallel	 issue	 to	 the	
above	question:	how	do	they	provide	knowledge	about	a	real-world	target	without	any	
observation	 of	 that	 target?	 Their	 answer	 is	 that	 thought	 experiments	 and	 computer	
simulations	 provide	 knowledge	 in	 the	 same	way:	 we	 build	 what	 we	 know	 into	 their	
construction,	that	is,	the	description	of	the	thought	experiment	or	the	assumptions	of	the	
computer	simulation,	and	this	knowledge	is	then	transformed	through	a	logical	process.	
Thus,	 computer	 simulations	 can	 also	 be	 reconstructed	 into	 arguments,	 and	 their	






8 Norton’s reconstruction is limited to the “destructive” part of Galileo’s thought experiment and does not 
include the step that is central to Brown’s platonism view, i.e. the introduction of the new theory that all bodies 
fall at the same speed. This is because, Norton argues, the move involves a problematic assumption, namely that 
the ‘speed of fall of bodies depends only on their weights’ (1996, 342).  




as	 in	 the	case	of	physical	experiments	and	 ‘inferring’	as	 in	these	cases,	where	thought	
experiments	can	be	articulated	 in	 terms	of	 inferences	drawn	 from	what	 is	 implicit.	 In	








explanation).	However,	 if	 the	 ‘given	 theory’	 is	 expanded	 to	 include	 the	argument	 as	 a	
whole,	then	clearly	the	conclusion	is	explicable	–	we’ve	just	given	an	argument	for	it!	In	



























and	 inductive	 inferences	 does	 not	 constitute	 genuine	 discovery	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	
experiments	(2012,	409).	And	Beisbart	(2012,	2018)	has	explicitly	endorsed	Morgan’s	
account	when	discussing	the	epistemic	status	of	simulations,	offering	the	example	of	the	
Michaelson-Morley	experiment	 (1887)	 that	undermined	 the	view	 that	 the	earth	has	a	
non-zero	velocity	with	respect	to	the	ether.	As	Beisbart	argues,	 this	experiment	 ‘has	a	
complicated	 set-up,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 assumptions	 are	 needed	 to	 interpret	 its	 data	 as	






























above	 how	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 thought	 experiments	 confound,	 rather	 than	 merely	
surprise,	may	depend	on	how	they	are	characterised.	However,	what	 is	 crucial	 is	 that	
even	when	presented	in	the	form	of	an	argument,	they	can	be	disruptive	in	the	sense	of	












knowledge.	 Simulations	differ	 in	 that	designing	 and	 running	 a	 simulation	 is	 a	way	 ‘of	
filling	out,	making	explicit,	and	probing	our	theoretical,	conceptual	and	empirical	ideas’	
(Currie	2018,	p.	656).	This	is	still	a	way	of	generating	knowledge	(and	can	bring	about	
productive	surprises)	 	but	unlike	the	experiment	case,	 it	does	not	involve	this	 ‘contact	
with	new	empirical	results’	(ibid).	Likewise,	thought	experiments	probe	our	theoretical,	
conceptual	 and	 empirical	 ideas.	 However,	 there	 are	 important	 differences	 between	






In	 order	 to	 explore	 those	 differences,	 let	 us	 begin	 with	 the	 view	 that	 computer	













high	 standards	 of	 intelligibility,	 because	 the	 whole	 process	 takes	 place	 in	 cognition’	
whereas	 in	 a	 computer	 simulation,	 ‘it	 is	 the	 multitude	 of	 interrelated	 steps	 that	 can	
render	the	overall	process	opaque’	(2018,	p.	485).	If	we	take	him	to	mean	mere	surprise,	
as	opposed	to	confoundment,	then	his	claim	is	that	we	are	more	likely	to	get	surprising	
behaviours	 (some	of	which	may	be	productive)	 from	computer	simulations	 than	 from	
thought	experiments,	as	the	latter	are	“transparent”	in	a	way	that	the	former	are	not.17		
	
However,	 characterising	 computer	 simulations	 as	 more	 complex	 or	 opaque	 thought	
experiments	 misses	 something	 important	 about	 the	 latter.	 Firstly,	 part	 of	 what	 is	
surprising	about	thought	experiments	is	their	simplicity.	There	is	something	surprising	
in	Galileo’s	 thought	 experiment	 that	 it	 had	 such	 significance	 in	 the	history	of	 science,	
despite	 being	 a	 simple	 imagined	 scenario,	 involving	 the	 behaviour	 of	 bodies	 being	





clear	access	 to	our	 imaginings	and	 the	connections	between	 them,	and	hence	 thought	















Thus,	 returning	 to	 Galileo’s	 thought	 experiment,	 Gendler	 has	 argued	 that,	 contra	 to	
Norton’s	 account,	 it	 is	 not	 straightforward	 to	 conclude	 that	 Aristotelian	 physics	 is	











that	 the	thought	experiment	 is	 indispensable	and	cannot	be	reconstructed	 in	Norton’s	
sense	without	losing	its	demonstrative	force.21	This	suggests	that	the	imagination	allows	





Our	 conclusion,	 then,	 is	 that	 thought	 experiments	 open	 up	 space	 for	 a	 discussion	 of	
































































Einstein	 begins	 by	noting	 that	 ‘[t]he	 results	 of	 the	 previous	 investigation	 [namely	 his	
paper	setting	out	the	basis	of	Special	Relativity]	lead	to	a	very	interesting	conclusion…’,	
an	opening	sentence	that	may	indeed	indicate	his	surprise	at	the	result.	He	then	invokes	
Maxwell’s	equations,	which,	as	he	notes	 in	a	 footnote,	 incorporate	 the	principle	of	 the	





of	emitting	 the	 light	pulses.	The	problem	is,	 the	expression	 for	 the	kinetic	energy	of	a	




Ohanian	2009,	 p.	 168).	With	 this	 at	 hand,	 he	 could	 then	 obtain	 an	 expression	 for	 the	
change	in	kinetic	energy	of	the	body	when	it	emits	the	pulses	of	light	in	its	rest	frame,	as	
observed	 from	 a	moving	 frame.	 Finally,	 he	 took	 the	 low-speed	 approximation	 of	 the	
energy,	by	neglecting	magnitudes	of	fourth	and	higher	orders,	and	substituting	that	in	his	
expression	he	obtained,	in	modern	form,	E=mc2.	Interestingly,	given	what	was	to	come,	
he	 concluded	 with	 the	 speculation	 that	 ‘It	 is	 not	 impossible	 that	 with	 bodies	 whose	
energy-content	 is	variable	to	a	high	degree	(e.g.	with	radium	salts)	 the	theory	may	be	















































Granted,	 then,	 the	 surprise	 associated	 with	 Einstein’s	 result,	 what	 is	 its	 epistemic	
significance,	 if	 any?	Again,	we	have	 to	 take	 care	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 requirement	of	
inexplicability	in	the	context	of	a	given	theory.	If	that	is	taken	to	be	Special	Relativity	itself,	
then	clearly	the	result,	being	derived	from	that	theory,	is	not	inexplicable	in	terms	of	it!	
However,	 the	 above	 historical	 considerations	 suggest	 that	 we	 should	 take	 the	 ‘given	
theory’	 to	 be	 the	 classical	 ‘electromagnetic	 worldview’	 of	 the	 time,	 with	 any	
confoundment,	in	Morgan’s	sense,	associated	with	the	establishment,	in	that	context,	of	















29 It has been suggested that what surprised Meitner were the technological implications of the result. However, 
granted that she is recalling her past surprise, this does not seem plausible given that such implications were not 









In	 this	 case,	 involving	 the	 discovery	 of	 novel	 properties	 of	 particles,	 she	 argues	 that	
scientists	cash	out	the	value	of	such	novel	results	in	terms	of	indicating	a	direction	for	
future	 research:	 ‘This	 appraisal	 that	 potentially	 theoretically	 unexpected	 results	 can	
provide	 future	 fertility	 helps	 us	 to	 begin	 to	 understand	 how	 results	 that	 contradict	
expectations	can	be	valued.’	 (ibid.,	p.	7).	Thus,	Ritson	argues,	 the	positive	appraisal	of	
disruption	 is	 based	 on	 forward	 looking	 assessments	 of	 future	 fertility,	 or	 forms	 of	
heuristic	appraisal.	She	notes,	in	particular,	the	comments	of	scientists	who	are	effusive	




in	 terms	 of	 a	 given	 theory	 and	 in	 this	 sense,	 being	 disruptive	 is	 broader	 than	
confoundment.	The	interchangeability	of	mass	and	energy	is	appropriately	characterised	
as	 disruptive	 in	 this	 sense	 and,	 as	 expressed	 by	 Einstein,	 was	 also	 fertile	 in	 that	 it	
indicated	the	direction	of	future	research.	This	sense	of	‘future	fertility’	was	captured	by	
Peirce	 with	 the	 phrase	 ‘esperable	 uberty’,	 applied	 to	 the	 ‘hoped	 for’	 ‘fruitfulness’	 or	






















Recent	 discussions	 of	 the	 value	 of	 such	 theoretical	 fertility	 have	 been	 shaped	 by	
McMullin’s	 (1976)	 distinction	 between	 fertility	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 actual	 success	 that	 a	
theory	has	in	opening	up	new	avenues,	dealing	with	problems	and	anomalies,	etc.,	which	
he	calls	‘proven’	or	P-fertility;	and	fertility	in	the	sense	of	designating	the	potential	of	a	













again,	 that	 although	 the	 extension	 of	 Einstein’s	 theory	was	 ‘new’	 and	hence	might	 be	
regarded	as	the	occasion	for	surprise,	the	relevant	phenomenon,	generally	characterized,	
was	not	entirely	novel.	As	we	have	said,	this	supplied	grounds	for	hope	that	the	theory	
















We	 began	 by	 considering	 Morgan’s	 distinction	 between	 ‘mere’	 surprise	 and	
confoundment,	where	the	latter	is	distinguished	from	the	former	by	virtue	of	the	relevant	
result	 being	 inexplicable	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 given	 theory	 and	 thereby	 laying	 beyond	 our	
control.	We	have	argued	that,	first	of	all,	considerations	of	the	value	of	surprise	in	science	


























it	may	be	 the	most	 pertinent	 in	 the	 theoretical	 context.	 And	 although	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
conceive	of	phenomena	in	and	of	 themselves	as	 ‘fertile’	 in	this	respect,	one	can	surely	
extend	 the	 notion	 beyond	 the	most	 theoretical	 levels	 to	 those	 typically	 described	 as	
‘phenomenological’.33		
Our	 core	 claim,	 then,	 is	 that	 focussing	 on	 this	 disruptive	 aspect	 allows	 us	 to	
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